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CASENOTE
KNOCKING THE EAGLE OFF THE PATENT
OWNER'S SHOULDER: CHIRON HOLDS THAT
JURORS DON'T HAVE TO BE TOLD THAT A
PATENT IS PRESUMED VALID
David C. Bohrert

I.

INTRODUCTION

The development of patent law in the United States has been
marked by a high level of confidence that the Patent Office "gets it
right" when it issues a patent. This confidence sprang up from the
belief that a patent application is subjected to a thorough investigation
by well-trained examiners who regularly analyze the technical issues
presented by the patent application, and whose job it is, day in and
day out, to make sure that patents are awarded to only those
applications that comply with the patent rules.
Based upon the high level of confidence in the decisions made
by Patent Office examiners, courts derived the presumption that a
patent is valid. Congress ultimately codified both this presumption,
and that the burden of proving invalidity, falls upon the person
challenging the patent, in amendments to the patent statute. Courts, in
turn, have interpreted the amended statute as requiring that the
challenger meet a higher standard of proof, clear and convincing
evidence, in order to overcome the presumption.
The overall effect of the presumptions, burdens and standards
originating from the core confidence in the patent examiner's decision
is to make it harder to invalidate an issued patent. Patent owners
therefore wear the American eagle on their shoulders: those who

t David C. Bohrer is a partner in the Silicon Valley office of Dechert LLP, where he
specializes in intellectual property litigation.
Mr. Bohrer can be reached at
david.bohrer@dechert.com. The views expressed herein are Mr. Bohrer's current, personal
views, and should not be attributed to, and do not necessarily represent the views of, Dechert
LLP or any of the Firm's former, present or future clients.
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attack the validity of a patent must overcome the significant obstacles
that spring from the belief that the government "gets it right."
There is a perception among an increasing number of legislators,
judges, and practitioners, however, that patent examiners are making
mistakes and issuing an unduly large number of invalid patents. This
perception has caused the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and,
most recently, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to propose
changes to the patent laws that make it easier to challenge the validity
of issued patents.' The proposed reforms therefore seek to knock the
eagle off of patent owners' shoulders: the growing suspicion that the
government "gets it wrong" has created the impetus for reforms
directed at lowering, if not eliminating, the significant obstacles to
proving invalidity.
The recent decision in Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc.
demonstrates that the Federal Circuit is already moving in the same
direction as the proposed reforms. 2 In Chiron, the Federal Circuit
held that the district court was not required to instruct the jury that a
patent is presumed valid.3 The decision of the Federal Circuit thus set
the stage to approve of a situation where the presumed correctness of
the government's actions and the presumed validity of the patent are
not readily transparent to the jury in the trial of a patent infringement
case. 4 Although not so far reaching as the FTC's proposal to lower
the burden of proving invalidity, Chiron knocks the eagle off of the
patent owner's shoulder by denying the jury the compelling
explanation for why the heavy burden of proving invalidity is
imposed upon the party challenging the validity of the patent. Chiron
is likely a harbinger of further judicial implementation of the
proposed reforms. Its unspoken, but nonetheless obvious rationale, is
1.
See FED. TRADE COMM'N; TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, A REPORT BY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
(2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/index.htm [hereinafter FTC RPT.]. The FTC
RPT. is the end product of 24 days of hearings on the "proper balance of competition and patent
law and policy" and includes an eighteen page executive summary. Id. at Executive Summary,
at 3. See also NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE
21 ' CENTURY (Stephen A. Merrill etal. eds., 2004), available at
http://books.nap.edu/catalog/10976.html (last visited October 30, 2004) [hereinafter NAS RPT.].
The NAS RPT. by the National Research Council, operating arm of the National Academy of
Sciences was the result of a series of public meetings involving economists, scholars,
practitioners, judges, legislators and business people regarding the operation of the patent
system and whether changes should be made in the administration of the patent system. Id. at

ix, 2.
3.

Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1258-1259.

4.

Id.

2.
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that the challenger should not bear the traditional heavy burdens
associated with proving invalidity if the patent examiner cannot be
relied upon to "get it right."

II. PATENT OWNERS WEAR THE EAGLE ON THEIR SHOULDERS
A recurrent theme throughout what are literally decades of
developing patent law is the confidence expressed by judges,
practicing attorneys, and academics in the job done by the Patent
Office. Patent examiners have long been viewed as correctly
meets the6
examining patents to make sure the claimed invention
5
novelty,
matter,
subject
of patentable
tests
statutory
7
8
9
nonobviousness,
utility, and disclosure such that, at least
historically, there has been a high level of confidence that bad patents
are not being allowed to slip through the system.
The confidence that patent examiners make the right decisions is
based first on the belief that patent examiners are both highly trained
and well-experienced in investigating patent applications. 10 Model

5. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). Patentable subject matter encompasses products,
processes, machines or compositions of matter. Id.
6. See id. § 102. The patent laws protect only "new" inventions that are not already
known to persons skilled in the same field or are not already described in the prior art. The
phrase "prior art" refers to any information (including technical articles, existing patents or other
materials) which describe public technical knowledge that was effectively known before the

invention.

See

MARTIN FLIESLER ET AL., MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 47 (2002), availableat
www.cand.uscourts.gov/cand/ForAttys.nsf/0/4ed41e5a5972b27a88256d6e005cee5d/$FILE/Mo
delPat.PDF (last visited October 30, 2004) [hereinafter 2002 N.D. CAL. PATENT INSTR.].
7. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000). Section 103 effectively requires that the subject matter
of the invention is beyond the ordinary abilities and knowledge of persons skilled in the same
field (art) as the invention. Id, ("A patent may not be obtained.., if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole
would have been obvious.., to a person having ordinary skill in the art .... ") (emphasis
added).
8. See id. § 101. The utility test requires that the invention have a practical purpose.
9. See id. § 112. Among other things, the quidpro quo for obtaining a patent is that the
inventor provides a written description of the invention sufficient to ensure that the inventor was
at the time of invention in possession of what he may later claim is covered by his patent,
describe in the patent, or "enable" persons skilled in the art to make the invention without undue
experimentation, and describe what the inventor deemed was the best way ("best mode") of
carrying out his invention. Id.
10. See, e.g., Parker v. Motorola, Inc., 524 F.2d 518, 521 (5th Cir. 1975) (recognizing
"the acknowledged experience and expertise of the Patent Office personnel"); Am. Hoist &
Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
The deference that is due to a qualified government agency presumed to
have properly done its job, which includes one or more examiners who
are assumed to have some expertise in interpreting the references and to
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jury instructions have incorporated this sentiment in instructions,
providing that "[a] patent results from the action of a patent examiner
technically trained in the field to which the patent relates and also
trained in the legal requirements and regulations of the Patent and
Trademark Office for the issuance of valid patents,"" and that:
[The Patent Office] has more than a thousand technically educated
IT]he
examiners who examine applications for patents ....
examiner reviews.., the patent application[,] . .. . makes a search
of the [Patent Office] records for prior art[,] .... considers...
whether each claim that defines an invention is new, useful, and
not obvious[,] .... then advises the applicant in writing what the
examiner has found .... [T]his process may go back and forth
between the patent examiner.., and the applicant for several
the
months or even for years until the examiner is satisfied that
12
application and claims meet the conditions for patentability.
Further motivation for deferring to examiners' decisions comes
from the principle that government agencies are presumed to have
done their job correctly. 3 The Patent Office, as an "executive
department[ ] of the government .... charged with the administration
of the patent system," determines among other things whether the
validity of claimed inventions is supported by the evidence. 14 The
patent examiner's approval of a patent application, therefore, is
entitled to the presumption that he did his job correctly.' 5
Having concluded that the Patent Office "gets it right" when it
issues a patent, courts derived the presumption that an issued patent is

be familiar from their work with the level of skill in the art and whose
duty it is to issue only valid patents.
Id.
11.
(2004).

3 BARRY KRAMER & ALLEN D. BRUFSKY, PATENT LAW PRACTICE FORMS

12.
AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION,
MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS 2-3 (1998), availableat

§

80:76

AIPLA's GUIDE TO

http://www.aipla.org/Content/ContentGroups/Publications 1/Publications available for viewing
1/juryinst.pdf (last visited October 30, 2004) (hereinafter AIPLA PATENT INSTR.).
13. The rationale of assumed correctness of administrative agencies such as the Patent
Office has its genesis in Morgan v. Daniels, 153 U.S. 120, 125 (1894). See also Solder Removal
Co. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 582 F.2d 628, 633 n.10 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (citations
omitted).
14. See Morgan, 153 U.S. at 124; 35 U.S.C. §§ 1(a) ("[The Patent Office] is an agency of
the United States, within the Department of Commerce.") and 2(a) ("[The Patent Office] shall
be responsible for the granting and issuing of patents .... ").
15. See Am. Hoist, 725 F.2d at 1359; Solder, 582 F.2d at 633; see also Brooktree Corp. v.
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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valid,16 which in turn provided the basis for imposing several
significant obligations upon accused infringers whose defense is that
the patent is invalid.
First, the presumption places the burden of going forward on the
challenger, such that the challenger has the burden of proceeding first
and establishing a prima facie case. 17 Second, the presumption places
the burden of proving invalidity, also known as the burden of
persuasion, on the challenger. 18 This burden remains in existence
throughout the litigation and cannot be shifted back to the patent
owner. 19 Even if the challenger presents evidence of prior art at trial
that was not considered by the patent examiner, this does not effect
the presumption of validity, i.e., the presumption is not "weakened"
20
or "undercut," nor does it change who has the burden of proof.
Third, in order to overcome the presumption of validity and
show that the challenged patent is invalid, the challenger's evidence
must meet the standard of proof of "clear and convincing evidence.'
This is a higher standard of proof than the "preponderance of the
evidence" standard that a patent owner must meet in order to prove
infringement of its patent. To prevail under the "preponderance of the
evidence" standard, the patent owner need only persuade the jurors
that what the patent owner seeks to prove is more probably true than

16. See Am. Hoist, 725 F.2d at 1359 ("Behind [the presumption of validity] was the basic
proposition that a governmental agency such as the then Patent Office was presumed to do its
job."); Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132, 1139 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("Th[e]
statutory presumption [of validity] derives in part from recognition of the technological
expertise of the patent examiners ....[T]he examination procedure and result should be given
appropriate consideration and due weight by the court.").
17.
See Am. Hoist, 725 F.2d at 1360; Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530,
1534 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Avia Group Int'l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1562 (Fed.
Cir. 1988).
18. Am. Hoist, 725 F.2d at 1360.
19. Id.
20. Id.; see also Applied Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am. Inc.,
98 F.3d 1563, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Solder, 582 F.2d at 633. While new prior art not before
the Patent Office does not affect the presumption of validity, it does eliminate or reduce the
deference due the Patent Office and thereby may discharge the attacker's burden, but neither
shifts nor lightens the challenger's burden of proof or standard of proof. Am. Hoist, 725 F.2d at
1360; Solder, 582 F.2d at 633. Thus, the Federal Circuit distinguishes the burden and standard
of proof, on the one hand, from the deference due the Patent Office based upon the rationale of
assumed administrative correctness, on the other, insofar as the consideration of new prior art is
concerned.
21. Schumer v. Lab. Computer Sys., Inc., 308 F.3d 1304, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Juicy
Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 292 F.3d 728, 736 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Monsanto Co. v. Mycogen
Plant Science, Inc., 261 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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not true. 22 Trial counsel will often explain this standard to the jury by
asking them to think of the patent owner's and challenger's evidence
as having been placed on opposite sides of a scale. 23 The patent
owner meets the burden of proving infringement by a preponderance
of the evidence so long as the evidence supporting the patent owner's
claims would make the scales "tip even the slightest" in the patent
owner's favor.24

In comparison, "clear and convincing evidence" must not just
"tip the scales" in one direction, but must go further and produce in
the minds of the jurors an abiding conviction that the truth of what the
challenger seeks to prove, namely, the invalidity of the patent, is
"highly probable." 25 Some model patent jury instructions go so far as
to expressly advise the jury that the burden imposed upon the
challenger of proving invalidity by "clear and convincing" evidence is
,,26
a higher standard than "preponderance of the evidence.
In Radio Corp. of America v. Radio Laboratories, Inc., the
Supreme Court recognized a high standard of proof in the face of
presumed patent validity long before the statutory codification of the
presumption. 27 Speaking for the Court, Justice Cardozo concluded
that "[t]hrough all the verbal variances, however, there runs this
common core of thought and truth, that one otherwise an infringer
who assails the validity of a patent fair upon its face bears a heavy

22.
See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR PATENT CASES IN THE UNITED STATES
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE, Preliminary Jury Instructions, Burden of Proof at 7,

and General Jury Instructions, § 1.3, Burdens of Proof, at 3 (2003) (on file with author)
[hereinafter 2003 DEL. PATENT INSTR.. These proposed jury instructions are promulgated by
the Jury Instruction Subcommittee of the Intellectual Property Section of the Delaware State Bar
Association in June 2003. Notwithstanding their status as drafts that have not yet formally been
adopted by the Federal Court in Delaware, the federal court judges are already requiring that
counsel use them. Cf 2002 N.D. CAL. PATENT INSTR., supra note 6, at 9 ("To prove
infringement of any claim, (patent holder] must persuade you that it is more likely than not that
[alleged infringer] has infringed that claim.").
23. See e.g., 2003 DEL. PATENT INSTR., Preliminary Jury Instructions, Burdens of Proof,
at 7, and General Jury Instructions § 1.3, Burdens of Proof, at 3.
24. id.
25. Id
26. See id., General Jury Instructions, § 4.1 Presumption of Validity, at 33 ("Proof by
clear and convincing evidence is a higher burden than proof by a preponderance of the
evidence."); THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT BAR ASSOCIATION MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
§ 1.1, Burdens of Proof, at 2 [hereinafter FCBA PATENT INSTR.] ("The first burden of proof
standard requires that, in order for a party to prevail, you must be persuaded that what the party
seeks to prove is more probably true than not true. The second burden of proof standard is a
higher one. It requires that you must be persuaded that it is highly probable that what the party
seeks to prove is true.") (emphasis added).
27. Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Lab., Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 8 (1934).
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burden of persuasion, and fails unless his evidence has more than a
dubious preponderance. 2 8
The trend over time has been to further strengthen the
presumption of validity. Historically, the presumption was part of a
judge-made body of patent law that came into existence over 100
years ago. 29 Nevertheless, courts were far from consistent, even
The
contradictory, in their application of the presumption. 30
legislature therefore sought to impose statutory restraint in the form of
the Patent Act of 1952, which added to the patent statute the simple
statement that "a patent shall be presumed valid" and that "the burden
of establishing invalidity of a patent shall rest upon a party asserting
it."' l The drafters of the amendments
sought to give the presumption
"greater dignity and effectiveness." 32
Notwithstanding the codification of the presumption in the patent
statute, the presumption still "carried no weight in some circuits and
little weight in most." 33 One of the primary motivations behind the
creation in 1982 of the Federal Circuit-a national court that hears all
patent appeals-was the widely perceived need to recognize and
consistently apply the presumption of validity.34 By any measure
chosen, the creation of the Federal Circuit has done just that. The
Federal Circuit has emphasized that the presumption of validity is
permanent, clarified that the challenger's burden of proving invalidity
is the high standard of clear and convincing evidence, and held that
the presumption controls even where the prior art introduced at trial
as proof of invalidity was not considered by the examiner, and that
"where supposedly invalidating prior art was considered by the

28.
29.

1984).
30.
31.

Id.
See Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir.

Id.
Id.

32.
P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. 1, 54-55 (1954),
reprintedin 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 161, 215 (1993).
33.

Robert P. Taylor, Twenty Years of the FederalCircuit: An Overview, 716 PLI/PAT 9,

15(2002).
34.

See id. at 11 n.3 (citing Federal Courts Improvement Act. Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96

Stat. 25 (1982). Among other things, this legislation created the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. See also Brenda Sandburg, A Slow Road to Patent Reform: Congress Unlikely
to Move Quickly on FTC's ControversialProposals,THE RECORDER, Oct. 30, 2003, at 3 (citing
Prof. Mark Janis, University of Iowa Law School, "The subtext of the past debate was that

people wanted a strong application of the presumption of validity,.... [t]hat was a problem in
the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s.")
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Examiner, the Federal Circuit usually sides with the ...Patent35Office,
which was not true in many of the regional circuit[ ] [courts.],
So strong did the presumption of validity become under the
Federal Circuit's tutelage that, in its present form, it not only shifts to
the challenger the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut the
presumption, but also shifts to the challenger the ultimate burden of
In
persuading the decision-maker that the patent is invalid .
comparison, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a presumption
imposes on the party against whom it is directed only the burden of
going forward, but not the burden of persuasion.37
The strong belief that the Patent Office is correct when it issues a
patent spawned the presumption of validity and related burden of
going forward, burden of persuasion, and higher standard of proof,
which, collectively, make it much more difficult to invalidate a
patent.
As the challenger is responsible for proving that the
government was wrong when it issued the patent, the challenger must
take on not just the patent owner but also the United States
Government. The practical significance of these legal developments
is that the patent owner wears the American eagle on his shoulder.
Those who attack the patent must overcome the significant obstacles
that have sprung from the belief that the government "gets it right."
III. PROPOSED REFORMS WANT TO KNOCK THE EAGLE OFF

A. Loss of Confidence in Patent Office
More recently, the Patent Office has been sharply criticized for
issuing too many patents that should have been rejected due to the
invalidity or overly broad scope of their claims. 38 These substandard
39
"questionable ' 40 or "low
patents are
' '4 often characterized as "bad,,

quality.

A

There is certainly no lack of examples of apparently bad results.
Typical of such lists are a patent on a computer algorithm for

35. Taylor, supra note 33, at 15.
36. See Solder Removal Co. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 582 F,2d 628, 633 n.8
(Fed. Cir. 1978).
37.

See FED. R. EVID. 301.

38. FTC RPT., supra note 1, Executive Summary, at 5; NAS RPT., supranote 1,at 47.
39. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1495,
1496 (Summer 2001).
40. FTC RPT., supra note 1, Executive Summary, at 5.
41. NASRPT.,supranote 1, at48.
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searching a mathematical textbook table to determine the sine or
cosine of an angle, a patent for cutting or styling hair using scissors or
combs in both hands, a patent on storing music on a server and letting
users access it by clicking on a list of the music available, and a
patent on initiating forward motion on a child's swing by pulling on
the ropes and swinging it sideways (the last was subsequently ordered
to be re-examined by the director of the USPTO).42 The criticism is
particularly strong as to patents issued on inventions in technology
areas that are newly patentable, notably (1) patents allowed on human
genetic sequences, (2) business method applications filed in the wake
of the State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature FinancialGroup4 3
decision and many of the well-known Internet patents, including
Amazon's "one-click" shopping method and Open Market's "on-line
shopping cart," and (3) computer software patents and related
inventions, where the already high rate of filings was further
encouraged by AT&T v. Excel Communications, Inc.," which
"removed the requirement that software could be patented only as
embodied in a computer program 'and
therefore effectively permitted
5
patents on algorithms themselves. 4
Not surprisingly, Patent Office administrators have challenged
the criticism as based upon a relatively few hand-picked examples of
bad results and as erroneously relying upon anecdotal evidence as
opposed to empirical data.
As to these points, the patent
administrators have allies in the FTC and the NAS. The FTC offers
no opinion on whether there are in fact too many bad patents slipping
through the system and, with the exception of software patents, avoids
characterizing the evidence as reflecting a clear consensus that patent
quality has declined.46 The NAS is more emphatic in calling for
greater verification of the criticism of the Patent Office, stating:
"[a]berrant or typical or, for that matter, increasing or declining in
frequency[, the alleged increased incidence of low quality patents] is
impossible to determine on the basis of a few hand-picked examples
of apparently bad results. ' 4 7 The NAS similarly questioned the
reliance of some observers on anecdotal evidence, stating: "[t]he

42.

Id. at 47 (citing U.S. Patent Nos. 5,937,468; 6,257,248; 5,963,916; 6,368,227).

43.

State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

44.

AT&T v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

45.

See NAS RPT., supra note 1,at 43-45, 55-56.

46.

See FTC RPT., supranote 1, ch. 3 at 44.

47.

NAS RPT., supra note 1, at 48.
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claim that quality has deteriorated
48 in a broad and systemic way...
has not been empirically tested.,
But even absent harder empirical data, there is at the very least a
growing suspicion that bad patents are slipping through the system.
This cloud over the Patent Office's capabilities is based upon several
related circumstances, including workload pressures on the Patent
Office, workplace rules biased in favor of issuing a patent, high patent
approval rates, and high number of litigated patents deemed invalid.
1. Workload pressures on the Patent Office
The number of patent applications filed on an annual basis is
approximately 350,000,50 and they arrive at a rate of over 1,000 each
working day. 1 This is well over double the number of applications
filed ten years ago. 52 Moreover, the typical application has grown in
complexity, as represented by the growth in the number of claims and
prior art citations per application. 53 The number of patent examiners
(3,000) has not kept pace with this increase in workload. 54 Although
there are different estimates of the total time available for an examiner
to take the application from start to finish (i.e., read the application,
read the submitted prior art, search for and read the prior art in
databases accessible to the Patent Office, compare that prior art to the
inventions claimed in the application, write an office action, read and
respond to the response to the office action, most likely repeat the
steps related to generating an office action at least once, conduct an
interview with the applicant, and ensure that the figures and claims
are properly formatted), none of these estimates exceed 30 hours,
48. Id. at 3.
49. See id at 51 ("There are several reasons to suspect that more issued patents are
deviating from previous or at least desirable standards of utility, novelty, and especially nonobviousness and that this problem is more pronounced in fast-moving areas of technology newly
subject to patenting than in established, less rapidly changing fields."); FTC RPT., supra note 1,
ch. 3, at 44 ("Panelists generally agreed that too many questionable patents [relating to the
software and intemet industries] are issued .. "); Lemley, supra note 39, at 1528 ("The
presumption of validity has little if any basis in fact .... [Examiners] regularly miss the most
relevant prior art.").
50. Steve Kunin, Opposition and Post-Grant Review Panel, Remarks at the Ideas Into
Action: Implementing Reform Of The Patent System Conference sponsored by Berkeley Center
for Law and Technology, FTC and NAS (Apr. 16, 2004), available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/patentreform/transcripts/BCLT-Patent-Opposition.p
df.
51.

FTCRPT.,supranote l,ch. 5, at4.

52.
53.
54.

NASRPT.,supranote l,at51.
Id.
Id.
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which is far less than the time spent by either the lawyers or the triers
of fact in patent infringement cases. 55 Examiners simply do not spend
large amounts of time poring over a patent application or prior art.
These circumstances, accordingly, do not permit examiners to make
accurate judgments on the validity of the patents under
consideration.56
2. Workplace rules biased in favor of issuing patent
The combination of the examiner's compensation structure and
patent application procedures place tremendous pressure on the
examiner to issue a patent rather than reject an application, no matter
how weak the alleged invention seems. First, the examiner has the
burden of proving that an application does not meet the requirements
for patentability.5 7 Second, examiners are only required to write up
reasons for rejection but not reasons for allowance.5 8 Third, in the
words of one observer, "it is [almost] impossible to reject a patent
once and for all" due to the regulations providing that after "final
rejection" an applicant can re-file the same application (e.g., "a
continuation") an unlimited number of times.5 9 "The only way for an
examiner to guarantee that an application is finally disposed of is to
issue the patent.",60 Fourth, the examiner compensation system
functions through a combination of salary and bonus points
accumulated for "dispositions," i.e., final allowances or rejections of
patents. 6 "[G]iven [the] opportunities to continue prosecutions even
after rejections, 'the only way to earn bonus points with confidence is
55. See FTC RPT., supra note 1, ch. 5, at 5 (estimating the time spent on the application
process to be 8-25 hours); NAS RPT., supra note 1, at 51 n.31 (estimating the time spent on the
application process to be 15-30 hours); Lemley, supra note 39, at 1496 n.3, 1500 n.19
("Examiners have astonishingly little time to spend on each application--on average, a total of
eighteen hours .... ").
56.

See Brenda Sandburg, Reinventing the Patent System: NationalAcademy of Sciences

Adds Voice to Chorus on Fixing Patent Litigation, THE RECORDER, Apr. 20, 2004, at 10 citing
Prof. Lemley as saying "The PTO is not set up to make strong determinations on the validity of
a patent .... [It's] a light screen of the patent.".
Lemley, supra note 39, at 1496 n.3 (citing John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective
57.
Action in the Patent System: A Proposalfor Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 325

(2001) ("Long-established practice places the burden of persuasion and initial burden of
production upon examiners to generate rejections. Otherwise the application must be
allowed.")).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
FTC RPT., supra note 1, ch. 5, at 5 n.34 (citing Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six
61.
Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rightsfor Business Concepts and Patent System
Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 607 (1999)).
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to allow a patent application."' 62 The cumulative effect of these
factors is to create "a strong incentive to issue patents to persistent
applicants, rather than to continue rejecting the applications. 63
3.

High patent approval rates

The percentage of patents applied for that end up being issued is
extremely high. Depending upon how continuation, continuation-inpart and divisional applications are accounted for, the approval rate
ranges from seventy-four to as high as ninety-seven percent. 64 These
rates are in fact higher than officially reported by the United States
Patent Office and higher than patent approval rates in Europe and
Japan. 65 The concern is that the U.S. patent system yields an unduly
high "success" rate.66

4. High number of litigated patents deemed invalid
Only a relatively small number of patents, no more than two
67
It can reasonably be inferred
percent, are the subject of litigation.
that the patents that are litigated must have some competitive
significance or high economic value; otherwise, there is not sufficient
incentive to take on the very high cost of litigation. One observer
characterized litigated patent cases as "the cases that matter,"
suggesting that the additional time and money required to improve the
examination of the ninety-five percent of patents "that will either
never be used, or will be used in circumstances that don't crucially
rely on the determination of validity," is "largely [ ] wasted., 68 Thus,
data regarding the quality of litigated patents is significant, and what
this data shows is that in litigated cases that actually result in a final

62. Id.
63. Id. (citing Lemley, supra note 39, at 1496 n.3.)
64. NAS RPT., supra note 1, at 53-54; FTC RPT., supra note 1, ch. 5, at 6; see also Judge
Ronald Whyte, Remarks on Patent Reform at the Ideas Into Action: Implementing Reform Of
The Patent System Conference sponsored by Berkeley Center for Law and Technology, FTC
and NAS (Apr. 16, 2004), available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/patentreform/transcripts/BCLT PatentRemarks.pdf
(stating that the most shocking thing he learned after being on the bench is the percentage of
patents applied for that end up being issued, figures ranging from 74 percent to 90 percent);
Sandburg, supra note 52, ("Whyte said he hears students say all the time that they think only a
small percentage of patents are approved. Students will tell him that 'inventions don't come
along every day,' he said. 'I agree with that."').
NAS RPT., supranote 1, at 62.
65.
66. Id. at 54.
67. Lemley, supranote 39, at 1501.
68. Id. at 1510-1511.
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judgment on validity, issued patents are held invalid forty-six percent
of the time. 69 These are not the results one would expect to see if the
patent examiner was doing his job correctly.
Thus, while the debate over whether examiners issue
questionable patents rages on, the seeds of doubt regarding patent
examiners' capabilities have not just been planted but have flowered
to a full bloom. The confidence that the government "gets it right" no
longer exists, thus undercutting the core justification for both the
presumption that a patent is presumed valid and the obstacles to
invalidating patents that are based upon the presumption.
B. ProposedReforms Reflect Loss of Confidence
The loss in confidence has fueled several of the major proposed
reforms to the patent system. The common thread running through
these proposals is that the stacked deck of presumptions and burdens
of proof favoring the patent applicant no longer comports with the
real-world shortcomings of patent examination such that it should not
be so hard for a challenger to prove that a patent is invalid.
The FTC has proposed lowering the burden imposed upon the
challenger of providing invalidity from the heightened standard of
"clear and convincing evidence" to only a "preponderance of the
evidence.",70 The FTC expressly disagreed with the rationale that the
heightened standard was justified because the issued patent embodies
the finding of patent validity by a "neutral government agency using a
knowledgeable examiner.",7' The FTC said the realities of patent
examination dictated the application of a less stringent standard:
Presumptions and procedures that favor the grant of a patent
application, combined with the limited resources available to the
PTO, counsel against requiring "clear and convincing evidence" to
overturn that presumption. We believe the "clear and convincing
evidence" burden can undermine the ability of the court system to
weed out questionable patents .... 72
In addition, both the FTC and NAS have proposed changes that
will make it easier for the challenger to prove that an issued patent is
invalid because it is obvious from the perspective of what is already
in the scientific or technological literature or known to persons who
69. Id. at 1500 (citing John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, EmpiricalEvidence on the
Validity of LitigatedPatents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205-06 (1998)).
70. FTC RPT., supra note 1, ch. 5, at 28.
71.
Id., Executive Summary, at 10; see also id, ch. 5, at 27-28.
72. Id., Executive Summary, at 10.
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research, work, or publish in these areas.7 3 The obviousness inquiry
seeks to confirm that the claimed invention is "a significant enough
technical advance to merit the award of a patent., 74 It requires "a
level of development" that is a step "beyond not only the documented
prior art but also the practice of people of ordinary skill in th[e]
art... before a patent can issue., 75 Both the FTC and NAS view the
proper application of the standard as crucial to preventing the
issuance of questionable patents.7 6
The FTC specifically recommended that the courts tighten the
standards for the "commercial success" and "suggestion" tests that are
77
presently used to evaluate the obviousness of the claimed invention.
Courts may consider the commercial success of a claimed invention
as evidence that it was not obvious. The problem, according to the
FTC, is that courts and juries are willing to find commercial success
whenever the claimed features of the patent are co-extensive with
those of a successful product.78 This approach ignores the very real
possibility that factors other than the use of the inventive features may
The bar for satisfying the
have caused commercial success.7 9
commercial success test is set too low, which contributes to patents
issuing on obvious inventions. The FTC therefore recommended that
courts evaluate on a case-by-case basis whether commercial success
is a valid indicator of nonobviousness, and, further, that patentees, not
the challengers, bear the burden of proving that, in fact, the claimed
invention caused the commercial success.8 °
As for the "suggestion" test, the underlying rationale is that if
prior art would have suggested the claimed invention, then the
claimed invention is obvious. If not, then the claimed invention is not
obvious. The suggestion test thus asks to what extent the prior art
would have suggested to a skilled artisan that the subject invention
should be carried out and would have a reasonable likelihood of
success.
The FTC's recommended improvement of the suggestion test is
best explained with reference to some of the basic principles guiding
73. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a); FTC RPT., supra note 1, Executive Summary, at 10; NAS
RPT., supra note 1, at 81-82.
74.
FTC RPT., supra note 1, Executive Summary, at 10; see also id., ch. 4, at 4.
75. Id., ch. 4, at 4; NAS RPT., supra note 1, at 59.
76. FTC RPT., supra note 1, ch. 4, at 4-6; NAS RPT., supranote 1,at 61.
77. FTC RPT., supra note 1, ch. 4, at 9-19.
78. Id. at 17.
79. Id.; see also id., Executive Summary, at 11.
80. Id., ch. 4, at 19.
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the use of prior art to prove that an invention is obvious and therefore
invalid. A claimed invention will usually consist of several key
features or elements. For example, a system for inspecting a silicon
wafer on which chips are fabricated could include, as separate
elements, a laser beam projected onto the surface of the wafer, an
acousto-optic deflector that uses sound waves to deflect the beam in
very rapid and precise movements across the wafer surface, and a
collector or collectors that "see" and analyze light scattered by the
laser beam as it strikes the wafer surface in order to determine
whether the wafer is defective.
The invention in the example is entitled to patent protection
whether its individual elements are all new, i.e., they are not disclosed
in the prior art, all old, i.e., they can be found in the prior art, or are
partly new or partly old.8' As explained by the Federal Circuit,
"[v]irtually all inventions are82 combinations and virtually all are
combinations of old elements."
What is directly relevant to patentability is whether resources
such as the scientific literature (prior art) teach or "suggest" the same
combination of elements as is claimed in the patent.8 3 If so, the patent
84
is obvious and therefore invalid in the eyes of the patent law.
Recalling the example of the wafer inspection system, it is irrelevant
whether all three of its key elements, the laser, the acousto-optic
deflector and the collectors, are old. This invention is patentable so
long as the combination of these elements, as they are described in the
hypothetical patent, is not suggested by one or more prior art
references.85
The problem, according to the FTC, is that courts have
conditioned satisfaction of the suggestion test upon the introduction
by the challenger of evidence that the prior art expressly teaches the
same combination of elements as is described in the patent, something
that the FTC says is often not actually needed by persons skilled in

81.
Rosemount, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 727 F.2d 1540, 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
82. Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 698 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also
GNB Battery Tech., Inc. v. Exide Corp., 876 F. Supp. 582, 603 (D. Del. 1995) (Holding that it
was not error to instruct the jury that "[ilt is irrelevant that some or all of the elements of the
claims of... [the] patents may have been old. Virtually all inventions are combinations and
virtually all are combinations of old elements.").
83. Envtl. Designs, Ltd., 713 F.2d at 698 ("A court must consider what the prior art as a
whole would have suggested to one skilled in the art.").
84.

Id.

85.

Id.
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the art.8 6 Moreover, the FTC observed that insufficient weight was
being given to suggestions implicit in prior art as a whole, suggestions
from the nature of the problem to be solved, and the ability and
knowledge of one skilled in the art. 87 Thus, the FTC feels the bar for
satisfying the suggestion test is set too high, which again results in
patents issuing on obvious inventions. The solution recommended by
the FTC was that the courts, in applying the suggestion test, assume
an ability to combine or modify prior art references that is
with the knowledge of those skilled in the relevant
commensurate
88
art.
Although it does not offer specific recommendations regarding
obviousness, as does the FTC report, the NAS report similarly
documents what it describes as "the evolution of the law over the last
generation as reducing the size of the step required for patentability
under the non-obviousness standard and as allowing the issuance of
Translation: the courts, in their
patents on obvious inventions.
application of the obviousness standard, are making it too hard for the
challenger to prove invalidity on the basis of obviousness.
C. "RationalIgnorance" of the Patent Office
That both the FTC and NAS propose significant reforms directed
to the courts as opposed to the Patent Office, is itself a manifestation
of the loss of confidence in the ability of patent examiners to correctly
apply the patentability requirements. The FTC actually takes this
insight a step further and embraces the "rational ignorance" theory of
Stanford Law School Professor, Mark Lemley. 90 The theory is
premised in the first instance on empirical data showing that the
majority of issued patents, as many as ninety-five percent, are never
litigated or even licensed. 91 What logically follows from this data is
86. FTC RPT., supra note 1,ch. 4, at 11-13. The Federal Circuit has on different
occasions said that the suggestion need not be express, but can be "implicit from the prior art as
a whole." See In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Motorola, Inc. v. Interdigital
Tech. Corp., 121 F.3d 1461, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (stating there is no requirement that the prior
art contain an express suggestion to combine known elements to achieve the claimed
invention."). However, the testimony taken by the FTC was that the Federal Circuit generally
fails to interpret the suggestion test consistent with these quotes. FTC RPT., supranote 1, ch. 4,
at 11-12.

87.
88.
89.
90.
at 1497).
91.

FTC RPT., supra note 1,ch. 4, at 14.

Id. at 15.
NAS RPT., supra note 1,at 61.
FTC RPT., supra note 1, Executive Summary, at 7 n.24 (citing Lemley, supra note 39,
Lemley, supra note 39, at 1501.
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that many of the questionable patents that slip through the system are
never litigated nor licensed. As explained by Professor Lemley, it is
therefore more efficient and cheaper for society to conduct a detailed
and thorough investigation of validity in those relatively few
instances where somebody cares enough to litigate the patent. 92 He
concludes that "[i]n short, the PTO doesn't do a very detailed job of
examining patents, but we probably don't want it to. It is 'rationally
ignorant' of the objective validity of patents, in economics lingo,
because it is too costly for the PTO to discover those facts. 93
The FTC's reliance upon Professor Lemley's analysis is a
stinging indictment of the Patent Office. The FTC in effect agrees
that the amount of time and money required for the Patent Office to
get it right exceeds what anyone would reasonably want to pay.
According to the FTC, we should therefore acknowledge and accept
the "ignorance" of the Patent Office and direct available resources
towards making sure the courts get it right when the patents "that
matter" are litigated.
This perception, that patent examiners make mistakes, undercuts
the rationale favoring a strong presumption of validity and has
resulted in proposed reforms such as lowering the burden of proving
invalidity, as well as making it easier to prove invalidity based upon
the obviousness of the invention. A central reform strategy is that we
should accept that all we are going to get from the Patent Office in its
review of patent applications is a "quick once over." That the
challenger has the burden of going forward with proof that the
government acted incorrectly when it issued the patent is a far less
daunting task if the review by the patent examiner is considered more
of a preliminary screen, such that the government action receives far
less deference than if the examiner is believed to have conducted a
thorough investigation of the application. The proposed reforms
therefore knock the eagle off of the patent owner's shoulder: the loss
of confidence in the correctness of the government's action, i.e, the
belief that the government "got it wrong," has resulted in proposals to
lower, if not eliminate, significant obstacles to proving invalidity.

IV. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT Is HAPPY To OBLIGE
The Federal Circuit's recent decision in Chiron Corp. v.
Genentech, Inc.94 advances the reform agenda by refusing to require
92.

Id. at 1510-11;seealsoid.,at1497 n.6.

93.

Id. at 1497.

94.

Chiron, 363 F.3d at 1258-59.
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that the trial court instruct the jury that a patent is presumed valid.
The decision effectively bars the patentee from giving the jury the
compelling explanation as to why a heightened burden of proof is
imposed upon the challenger. The jury does not hear about hardworking and well-trained government examiners who are presumed to
have done their job correctly, nor do they hear that the patent, the fruit
of the government's thorough investigation, is presumed valid. The
decision in Chiron, therefore, makes it easier for the challenger to
meet its burden of proving to the jury that the patent is invalid.
The impetus for the Chiron decision and the practical
consequences that flow from the decision is the same as that which
motivates the recent proposals for reforming the patent system: the
government too often issues bad patents. Chiron is likely a harbinger
of future Federal Circuit decisions reducing the obstacles to proving
invalidity.
A. Jury Instructions
The importance of jury instructions to the outcome of a case
tried to a jury cannot be overestimated. Jury instructions provide the
law that governs the rights and obligations of the parties, or, to put it
in words closer to how a juror thinks about the instructions, they are
"rules" which people are supposed to follow. 95 The importance of
jury instructions in the eyes of the jury is underscored by the fact that
they come not from any of the parties to the litigation (whom jurors
rightfully suspect of biased presentation), but rather from the trial
judge.96 Indeed, one of the instructions given to the jury is that it is
the trial judge's job to tell them the rules.97
The jury instructions define the scope of argument and evidence
that may be given by the parties to the jury. In their closing
statements, lawyers may discuss the law (the rules) that are included
in the jury instructions. Counsel's discussion of the law is considered
so important to the jury's understanding of the significance of the
evidence that Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires
trial judges to advise counsel of the instructions that the court
95.
ROBERT E. JONES ET AL., RUTTER GROUP PRACTICE GUIDE: FEDERAL CIVIL TRIALS
AND EVIDENCE § 15:1 (2004).
96.
See id., §§ 14:65, 15:40; Bellotte v. Zayre Corp., 531 F.2d 1100, 1102 n.1 (1st Cir.
1976).
97.
See, e.g., 2003 DEL. PATENT INSTR., supra note 22, Preliminary Instructions, Course
of the Trial, at 13 ("After you have heard all of the evidence, I will instruct you on the law that

you must apply in this case."); see also id., General Jury Instructions, § 1.1, Introduction, at I
("I will now instruct you about the law that you must follow in deciding this case.").
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proposes to give the jury before counsel's final arguments. This rule
ensures that counsel know the precise words that will be used before
final argument as opposed to speculating as to what the court will say,
"giv[ing] counsel the opportunity to explain the instructions, argue
their application to the facts and thereby give the jury the maximum
assistance in determining the issues and arriving at a good verdict on
the law and the evidence," and "supplying a natural outline so that
arguments may be directed to essential fact issues which the jury must
decide." 98
The corollary is that in discussing the law in their closing
statements, counsel must accurately state the content of the jury
instructions and are not allowed to make an argument based on law
that the jury will not be given or that is otherwise misleading or
irrelevant in view of the jury instructions.99 Counsel are prohibited
from making arguments based on proposed instructions that the court
has excluded.' 00
Because jury instructions are blueprints for the legal theories
advanced in a case, the instructions are also used by the court as a
template to screen for and exclude evidence that is immaterial,
irrelevant or unduly prejudicial. The typical practice in federal trials
is for the trial judge to solicit proposed instructions, motions in limine
and dispositive motions prior to, or as part of, the preparation of the
final pre-trial order. A practical consequence of this process is that in
most instances the trial judge will have made before trial at least a
preliminary determination of what instructions will be given.
Documents and testimony that do not tend to prove or disprove an
issue framed by the instructions under consideration, or that are
directed to instructions already rejected by the court, most likely will
be excluded from evidence.
Jury instructions are a major consideration in litigated patent
cases because a significant number of these cases are tried to a jury.
In the late 1960s, just over three percent of patent cases were tried to
a jury. 10 ' This practice shifted dramatically after the Federal Circuit
came into being,2 such that, in 1994, seventy percent of patent trials
were to juries.'

98.

FED. R. CIv. P. 51 (b)(1); see also id., Advisory Committee Notes, 1987 Amendment.

99.

JONES ET AL, supranote 95, § 14:66.

100.

See id.

101.

Taylor, supra note 33, at 29-30.

102.

Id.
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B. A Case of FirstImpression
In Chiron, the Federal Circuit tackled for the first time the
question of whether the district court is required to instruct the jury on
District courts and professional
the presumption of validity.
associations have taken very different positions on the question.
District courts in at least the Third, Fifth and Eighth Circuits give
instructions that tell, the jury that a patent enjoys a presumption of
validity.10 3 For example, in the Third Circuit, the United States Court
for the District of Delaware says the following in its model patent
instructions:
Presumption of Validity
The granting of a patent by the Patent Office carries with it the
presumption that the patent is valid. From issuance of the patent, it
is presumed that its subject matter is new, useful and constitutes an
advance that was not, at the time the invention was made, obvious
to one of ordinary skill in the art. The law presumes, in the
absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, that the
Patent Office acted correctly in issuing the patent. Nevertheless,
once the validity of a patent has been put in issue, it is the
responsibility of the jury to review what the Patent Office has done
consistent with these instructions on the law.
This presumption of validity puts the burden of proving
invalidity on Defendant. While this presumption can be rebutted,
the burden is on Defendant to do so. This burden requires that
evidence that in this case
Defendant prove by clear and convincing
04
each of the asserted claims is invalid.'
Similarly, the Federal Judicial Center, an agency that Congress
created in 1967 to promote improvements in judicial administration in
federal courts, has produced a videotape tutorial on patents. The
videotape is now shown to juries on a regular basis as part of the trial
judge's preliminary instructions in a patent case. The narration to the
videotape tells jurors that "[t]o prove that a patent is invalid, the law

103. See, e.g., Trial Transcript at 1549, ADE Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp. (No. 00-892
KAJ) (reciting the jury instructions given February 4, 2004); Lifescan, Inc. v. Home
Diagnostics, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d 345, 378 (D. Del. 2000); Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v.
Gencor Indus. Inc., 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10333, at *21-23 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 30, 1989); Trial
Transcript at 1648-49, Itron, Inc. v. Benghiat (No. 99-501 JRT/FLN) ("The law presumes that
the.., patent is valid and enforceable, and presumes further that the Patent Office acted
correctly in issuing the patents.") (reciting the jury instructions given December 20, 2002).
104. 2003 DEL. PATENT INSTR., supra note 21, General Jury Instructions, § 4.1
Presumption of Validity, at 33.
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of proof since the PTO is presumed to have
requires a higher standard
10 5
correctly.
job
its
done
The rationale for instructing on the presumption is that jurors are
entitled to know what the law is, namely, that "[a] patent shall be
presumed valid.' 0 6 Moreover, this instruction "introduce[s] the
jurors to the fundamentals of validity" by explaining why the burden
of proving invalidity is on the challenger and why there is a
heightened standard of proof of clear and convincing evidence.' 0 7 An
instruction advising the jury on the clear and convincing evidence
standard, the presumption of validity and the relationship between the
two concepts "[is] at the core of the statutory scheme of patent
litigation." 10 8
Another reason for instructing on the presumption of validity is
that Federal Circuit decisions have discussed the effect of proposed
jury instructions on the presumption of a patent's invalidity, yet in
none of these decisions did the Federal Circuit hold that it is improper
to instruct on the presumption itself.' 09
In comparison, the Federal Circuit Bar Association's model
patent jury instructions tell the jury that the challenger has the burden
of proving invalidity by a heightened standard of evidence, but omit
any reference to the presumption of validity. The core language of
this instruction is as follows:
[Defendant] has challenged the validity of the ... patent claims on

a number of grounds. [Defendant] must prove that a patent claim
is invalid by the highly probable standard.
Likewise, the model patent instructions of the American
Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) advise the jury that

105. Videotape: An Introduction to the Patent System (Federal Judicial Center Oct. 2002),
available at http://www.fjc.gov/newweb/jnetweb.nsf/pages/557. The seventeen minute video is,
in the words of the Federal Judicial Center, "designed to be shown to jurors in patent jury trials.
It contains important background information intended to help jurors understand what patents
are, why they are needed, how inventors get them, the role of the [PTO], and why disputes over
patents arise." Id.
106. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000).
107. See 2003 DEL. PATENT INSTR., supra note 21, at General Jury Instructions, § 4.1,
Presumption of Validity, Comments, at 33; 2002 N.D. CAL. PATENT INSTR., supra note 6, §
A. I., Preliminary Instructions, at 2 n. 1.
108. Lifescan, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d at 377-378 (citing StandardHavens, 1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS, at *21-23).
109. See, e.g., Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1358 (Fed.
Cir. 1984); Mendenhall v. Cedarapids, Inc., 5 F.3d 1557, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
110.

FCBA PATENT INSTR., supranote 26, § 10.1 Validity In General, at 54.
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the challenger has the burden of proof without commenting on the
presumption of validity." '
The professional associations' rationale for excluding the
presumption is that it is a "procedural device" that imposes certain
burdens on the accused infringer, but is not "evidence" to be weighed
against the accused infringer's evidence. 1 2 There is also the concern
that "instructing the jury on the presumption in addition to informing
it of the clear and convincing burden of proof may cause jury
confusion as to its role in deciding invalidity. '13
Adding to the unsettled nature of this mix, the model patent rules
for the Northern District of California incorporate language on the
presumption as an optional element of the instruction on the burden
of proving invalidity. 14 The drafters explain that they simply could
not agree on whether to put the presumption into the instruction, and
instead chose to offer optional language on the presumption along
with a discussion in the drafting notes of the "pro" and "con"
arguments regarding its use. 15
Arguably, there are four major sources of model patent
instructions: District of Delaware, Northern District of California,
Federal Circuit Bar Association, and AIPLA. The divergent positions
taken in these model sets of instructions regarding the presumption of
validity show that there was no consensus on this matter as of the
time the Federal Circuit decided Chiron.
The different positions taken in the model instructions are
summarized as follows:
Source

Instruction on Presumption?

Delaware

Yes.

Fed. Cir. Bar Assoc.

Omitted without explanation.

AIPLA

Omitted with explanation.

N.D. California

Optional.

11l. AIPLA PATENT INSTR., supra note 12, at 6.
112.
FCBA PATENT INSTR., supra note 26, § 10. 1, Validity In General, at 54 (citing Avia
Group Int'l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear California, Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1562 (Fed Cir. 1988)).
113.

Id

114.
2002 N.D. CAL. PATENT INSTR., supra note 6, § A. 1,Preliminary Instructions, at 2
(providing that he optional language is as follows: "[The patent, when granted by the PTO, is

presumed to be valid but its validity can be challenged by others.]").
115. Id. at 2 n.1.
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C. Chiron Rationale
In Chiron, the parties were competitors in the engineering of
"monoclonal antibodies" used in the diagnosis and treatment of breast
cancer. Plaintiff Chiron's patent was broadly construed before trial to
cover defendant Genentech's product, and partial summary judgment
of infringement was entered in favor of Chiron. The parties also
stipulated before trial that Chiron's patent was invalid unless it was
entitled to the earlier filing date of applications from which it
continued. The ensuing trial therefore focused on whether the claims
sued upon were adequately described and enabled in the earlier
applications (the precondition to priority under section 120 of the
patent statute).
The jury determined that the priority applications did not satisfy
the written description and enablement requirements. When the
district court denied Chiron's motion for judgment as a matter of law
and a new trial, Chiron appealed to the Federal Circuit, which
ultimately affirmed the denial of the post-trial motions.
The bulk of the Federal Circuit's analysis in Chiron is devoted to
the issues of written description and enablement, with relatively little
attention given to alleged errors in the jury instructions and even less
space, a paragraph in fact, devoted to Chiron's argument that the
district court erred by instructing the jury on Genentech's burden of
proof without also adding 6 an instruction on the presumption of the
asserted patent's validity.' 1
The brevity of the Federal Circuit's discussion of the
presumption question is matched by the court's relatively shallow
substantive analysis. The Federal Circuit cited its previous decision
in Avia Group International, Inc. for the proposition that the
presumption is a procedural device as opposed to evidence to be
It also cited its
weighed against the challenger's evidence. 117
decisions in American Hoist and Moba for the proposition that the
presumption of validity and the heightened burden of proof are
interchangeable expressions of "a single hurdle to be cleared," such
18
that reference to the latter is sufficient.
The problem with the Federal Circuit relying upon these cases is
that none of them dealt with the specific issue of whether it is error
116. Chiron, 363 F.3d at 1258-1259.
117. Id. at 1259 (citing Avia, 853 F.2d at 1562).
118. Id. at 1258 (citing Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350,
1360 (Fed. Cir. 1984), and Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1319
(Fed. Cir. 2003)).
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for the district court to refuse to instruct on the presumption.
Moreover, the Federal Circuit did not address the arguments that
favored an instruction on the presumption, including the juror's right
to hear the law as it is set out in the patent statute, and the explanation
of why the burden of going forward, burden of persuasion, and
heightened standard of proof imposed upon the challenger assist the
jury in applying the "rules" to the evidence.
Whether one agrees or not with Chiron, the case is now binding
precedent as to whether a patent jury must be instructed on the
Although Chiron has petitioned for
presumption of validity.
certiorarito the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit's holding that an
instruction on the presumption is not required was not raised in the
petition. 1 9
D. DramaticConsequences
Notwithstanding Chiron's perfunctory analysis of the
presumption instruction, the ruling has dramatic consequences. It is
far easier to convince the jury that a patent is invalid if they are never
told that the government is presumed to have "gotten it right" when
its examiners issued the patent in the first place.
The gospel among patent trial attorneys is that jurors are
extremely reluctant to second-guess the examiner. This perception is
based upon the courtroom experience of many trial lawyers over time,
and is strongly reinforced by the "jury psychology" preached by the
specialized group of jury consultants that mock-try and consult on the
selection of jurors in patent cases,' 20 as well as empirical data
showing the lower percentage of jury verdicts finding a patent
invalid. 2 '
Why should jurors feel they cannot second-guess the examiner?
The answer is clear: this is what they are told to feel by the instruction
119.
Interview with Robert P. Blackburn, Chief Intellectual Property Counsel, Chiron
Corporation, in Berkeley, Cal. (Apr. 16, 2004).
120. Two well-known jury consulting services are Trial Behavior Consulting (at
http://www.trialbehavior.com) and Bowne DecisionQuest (at http://www.decisionquest.com).
Dr. Michael Tiktinsky, principal at Trial Behavior Consulting is a particularly strong proponent
of juror's reluctance to second-guess examiner's decisions. Interview with Michael Tiktinsky,
Principal, Trial Behavior Consulting, in Wilmington, Del. (Jan. 8, 2004).
121.
Allison & Lemley, supra note 69, at 212-213 (providing statistical support for
proposition that juries tend to favor patentees on validity questions and that juries are unlikely to
second-guess an examiner who has already considered and rejected a prior art reference). At
trial, only 33% of patents are held invalid. Lemley, supra note 39, at 1529 n.129 (citing
Kimberly Moore, Judges, Juries and Patent Cases-EmpiricalEvidence to Peek Inside the
Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 390 tbl.4 (2000)).
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on the presumption and related arguments by counsel. The neutral
and all-knowing trial judge, the credible source of "the rules," tells
jurors that patent examiners are trained government experts who are
presumed to have done their job correctly when they examined the
patent, and, therefore, that the patent issued by the examiner is
presumed valid.
The pro-examiner mindset is further strengthened by trial
counsel's entirely legitimate expansion upon the judge's "rules" that
the examiner acted correctly in issuing the patent and that the patent is
therefore presumed valid. Counsel, in their argument to the jury, can
encourage jurors to read the "rules" as describing examiners as highly
trained specialists who not only know more than lawyers or jurors do
about the technology in the patent, but who also have spent very long
periods of time poring over the patent application. The collective
effect of the trial judge's instructions and related counsel argument is
the creation of a very strong juror bias in favor of patent validity; and
the challenger has the heavy burden of overcoming this bias.
However, omitting the instruction on a patent's presumed
validity, thereby preventing counsel from extolling the examiner's
virtues, causes the pro-examiner bias to crumble. The Chiron ruling,
which does just this, therefore topples a major obstacle to proving
invalidity. Fully in step with proposed patent reforms, Chiron knocks
the eagle off the patent owner's shoulder: it lowers the obstacle to
proving invalidity that would otherwise exist if the jury were allowed
to hear how the government got it right.
That Chiron makes it easier to convince a jury that a patent is
invalid assumes even greater significance given recent statistics that
demonstrate the high percentage of patent cases that are now tried
before a jury. 12 2 Moreover, the patent jury trials affected by Chiron
are high stakes, high risk litigation in which the litigants incur large
fees and costs.
For example, the Law Practice Management Committee of the
AIPLA conducts an annual survey of intellectual property law
attorneys in the United States (AIPLA Survey) on subjects such as the
typical charges for patent litigation. 123 The 2003 AIPLA Survey
obtained information from attorney respondents for any given patent
litigation of which they had personal knowledge on the estimated
attorney fees and costs of three value-at-risk categories: less than $1
See Taylor, supra note 33, at 29-30.
AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION, AIPLA REPORT OF THE
123.
ECONOMIC SURVEY 2003 1, 19 (2003).
122.
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million at risk, $1-25 million at risk, and more than $25 million at
risk. 124 Over half of the respondents who said their primary practice
was devoted to dispute resolution (as opposed to non-litigation
activities such as patent prosecution or licensing) reported knowledge
25
of patent litigation where there was more than $25 million at risk.1
The median costs and fees of taking such a case to beyond pre-trial
discovery up through and including a final resolution (whether trial or
settlement), for all jurisdictions, was $3.9 million, and these figures
were even higher in specific jurisdictions that see more patent
litigation, including California at $4.9 million, Texas at $5 million,
126
Delaware at $4.9 million, and Washington, D.C. at $5 million.
Thus, the specific milieu affected by the Chiron rulings, patent jury
trials, is itself grounds for recognizing the important impact of the
Chiron decision.
A likely objection to these arguments is that Chiron's
importance is over-estimated because Chiron did not lower the
heightened standard for proving invalidity. This presumption, after
all, is merely a procedural device that imposes upon the challenger the
burden of proving invalidity by the higher standard. The presumption
and the heightened burden of proof are "in reality different
127
expressions of the same thing-a single hurdle to be cleared.',
Thus, Chiron does not make it easier to prove invalidity--or so the
argument goes.
The problem with this objection is that it fails to take into
account what happens when the reasons for imposing a higher burden
of proof, namely the presumption and all that it encompasses, are not
transparent to the jury. Omit the instruction and related argument on
the presumption, and what the jury is told is limited to the court's
advice that the challenger has the burden of proving invalidity by
clear and convincing evidence and that this is a higher standard of
proof than a preponderance of the evidence. There is no context

124.

Id. at 21.

125.

Id. at 64 tbl.10 (Table 10, Percent of Time in Primary Practice Devoted to Various

Types of Work, Dispute Resolution) and 94 tbl.22 (Table 22, Estimated Costs of Litigation, by
Location of Primary Place of Work, Estimate of Total Cost, Through End of Discovery and

Inclusive, in a Patent Infringement Suit, More Than $25 Million at Risk).
126. Id.at 94 tbl.22 (Table 22, Estimated Costs of Litigation, by Location of Primary Place
of Work, Estimate of Total Cost, Through End of Discovery and Inclusive, in a Patent
Infringement Suit, More Than $25 Million at Risk). Moreover, the average cost of patent
litigation is likely even higher given reported fees and costs in the 75th percentile of $5.9
million for all jurisdictions and $6 million in California and $7.9 million in Texas. Id.
127.
Chiron, 363 F.3d at 1258 (citing Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725
F.2d 1350, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
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given, no explanation that the presumed correction of the
government's action is so strong that the law not only shifts to the
challenger the job (i.e., the burden) of proving invalidity, but also
requires that the challenger come forward with an especially high
level of proof sufficient to overcome the presumption.
The practical consequence is that the jury has little or no
understanding of how much evidence is required to satisfy the
supposedly higher standard and no motivation for imposing the
Under these
supposedly heavier burden on the challenger.
circumstances, the challenger finds it much easier to convince the jury
to invalidate the patent. Common sense dictates that the presumption
and the heightened burden of proof are not interchangeable
expressions of "the same thing-a single hurdle to be cleared." If the
jury does not understand the reasons for shifting burdens and higher
standards, the likelihood is that the jury would set the hurdle much
lower than they would if they knew the full story.
Another objection could be that Chiron did not hold that it was
improper to give an instruction on the presumption of validity, but
only that it was not improper for the district court to refuse to give the
instruction. According to this argument, Chiron has not really made
it easier to invalidate the patent, because the district court still has
discretion under Chiron to decide that it will go ahead and instruct the
jury on the presumption.
The flaw in this argument is that it is based upon the erroneous
assumption that when the next case comes up, it is equally as likely
that the district court will allow the presumption instruction as it is
that it will not allow the instruction, or we at least do not know
enough to say which is the greater likelihood because Chiron did not
hold that the instruction should not be given.
More likely, when next this issue comes before a court, the
patent holder will offer the instruction that the patent is presumed
valid and the challenger will object, citing Chiron for the proposition
that the presumption is merely a procedural device and not evidence
to be weighed against the challenger's evidence, and that the
presumption is merely a different expression of the "same thing"
embodied in the higher burden of proof instruction. Not only is this
an accurate citation to Chiron, but there is also little or no
countervailing authority upon which the patent owner could rely that
directly requires giving the jury the explanation for imposing on the
challenger a higher burden of proving invalidity.
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True enough, the patent owner could generally argue the
importance of the presumption, but the trial judge will have already
figured out that the Federal Circuit does not believe that any
additional instruction on the presumption is required. In addition, the
trial judge will also want to avoid, at all costs, expanding the
instructions beyond the potentially confusing, wordy, and timeconsuming set that the trial judge already knows have to be given or
else commit reversible error.'2 8 In the words of one judge,
"[p]revailing practices of instructing juries are often so archaic and
unrealistic that even in relatively simple cases what jurors hear is little
more than legal mumbo jumbo to them," but that trial judges
nonetheless "adher[e] to archaic practices out of fear of being
reversed., 129 In the end, the likelihood that the presumption
instruction is accepted over the challenger's objection is slim to none.
So why would the Federal Circuit devote relatively little
attention in Chiron to a ruling having such dramatic consequences?
The unstated, but highly probable explanation is that the Federal
Circuit, just like the proponents of patent reform, has lost confidence
in the ability of patent examiners to issue valid patents. Just like the
reformers, the Federal Circuit now has serious concerns that too many
bad patents are slipping through the system. Having lost confidence
in the Patent Office, the Federal Circuit does not find it unduly
prejudicial to the patent owner to deny the patent owner the benefit of
judge-made rules or practices making it hard for the challenger to
prove invalidity. The previous pro-patent owner presumptions and
burdens were derived from the now discredited belief that the Patent
Office gets it right.
Sure, the practical effect of Chiron's ruling is to remove
significant obstacles to proving invalidity, but it is unlikely that the
Federal Circuit believes that this is a dramatic upheaval in the law that
would require lengthy discussion. Rather, the logical and necessary
consequence of recognizing and responding to the real-world issues

128.

It is not unusual in patent infringement cases for the judge to give the jury well over

100 separate instructions and special interrogatories, requiring the jury to listen to formal legal

statements for anywhere between 45-60 minutes-and this after sitting through a trial that
typically lasts two or more weeks. See, e.g., Trial Transcript at 1546-88, ADE Corp. v. KLATencor Corp. (No. 00-892 KAJ); Trial Transcript at 1608-74, Itron, Inc. v. Benghiat (No. 99501 JRT/FLN).

129. Structural Rubber Prods. Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707, 713 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(citing William W. Schwarzer, Communicating With Juries: Problems and Remedies, 69 CAL.
L. REv. 731, 732 (1981)).
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with the Patent Office is that it simply should not be as hard as it has
been to prove invalidity.
If it is true that Chiron was motivated by the loss of confidence
in the capabilities of patent examiners, then Chiron is likely a
harbinger of future Federal Circuit decisions that will remove
In particular, the
additional obstacles to proving invalidity.
heightened standard of proof for invalidity was a judge-made rule
derived from judges' interpretation of the statutory presumption of
validity.
Section 282 of the patent statute, although expressly
recognizing the presumption of validity and imposing upon the
challenger the burden of going forward, does not specify the standard
of proof that must be met by the challenger. 30 Instead, judges
developed the present standard of proof, clear and convincing
evidence, through a series of cases dating at least as far back as the
Supreme Court's 1934 decision in Radio Corp. of America v. Radio
Engineering Laboratories, Inc.13 1 Thus, no legislative action is
required to lower this judge-made standard of proof.
Given the serious concerns that too many bad patents are
slipping through the system, and relying upon the relatively few
patent litigations as the mechanism for achieving a truly efficient and
accurate determination of a patent's validity, the reform position is
that there is no reasonable explanation for imposing a higher burden
of proof on the challenger. In Chiron, the Federal Circuit signals that
it is already moving in this direction.
V.

CONCLUSION

The long-standing belief that the government "gets it right" has
been the genesis for stacking presumptions and burdens of proof in
the patent owner's favor. Patent owners have long worn the eagle on
their shoulders. They have for a long time reaped the benefit of the
court's confidence in the correctness of the government's action.
However, the Patent Office has come under sharp attack of late,
including numerous proposals that directly or indirectly reduce or
remove the obstacles to proving invalidity, thus knocking the eagle
off of the patent owner's shoulder.
Chiron effectively denies the jury the explanation for the heavier
burden of proving invalidity that is imposed upon the challenger, and
thereby makes it easier for the challenger to prove invalidity. Chiron
130.

See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000).

131.

Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Lab., Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 8 (1934); see also Am. Hoist &

Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359-1360 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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manifests the same loss of confidence in the Patent Office that gave
rise to the proposed patent reforms. It is likely the harbinger of future
decisions by the Federal Circuit that will make it even easier to prove
invalidity.

